The Long March of Governing Radicals
As we kick off 2026, Ben Domenech’s sharp-eyed piece in the New York Post yesterday nails a timeless truth in American politics: Democrats who run as level-headed moderates too often reveal their true progressive colors once they’re sworn in. Take the freshly minted governors Abigail Spanberger in Virginia and Mikie Sherrill in New Jersey. The media fawned over them as “moderate women” with bipartisan creds-The New York Times and Washington Post practically crowned them as the sensible future of the party. But Spanberger’s agenda? Dismantling state cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, scrapping mandatory minimums for heinous crimes like rape, slapping new taxes on retail deliveries, Netflix subscriptions, and even banning gas-powered leaf blowers while pushing abortion access right up to birth and aggressive gerrymandering to cement Democratic power. Sherrill? She’s styling her term as a revolutionary fight against “King George” Trump, complete with vows to lead the anti-Trump resistance and echoes of abolishing ICE. This isn’t moderation; it’s a classic bait-and-switch that fools swing voters and erodes faith in the system.
But this sleight-of-hand isn’t confined to New Jersey and Virginia-it’s a national Democratic playbook that’s been refined over decades. Voters are pragmatic folks; they’ll tolerate a bit of ideological flexibility if it delivers results, like a booming economy or balanced budgets. The problem is, today’s Democratic Party has purged the very pragmatists who could pull that off, leaving a void filled by base-pleasing purists. As we eye the 2026 midterms, let’s unpack the history: from the purge of pro-life Democrats who flipped for power, to principled conservatives like Phil Gramm who wouldn’t bend, to Bill Clinton’s moderate mirage that turned into real bipartisan wins-only for his views to become persona non grata in the modern party. And today? The bench is thin on true triangulators, with outliers like John Fetterman showing glimmers of hope but no one fully filling the gap.
Back in the 1980s and 1990s, the Democratic Party still had room for ideological diversity, especially on hot-button issues like abortion, which was treated more as a matter of conscience than a litmus test. But for those eyeing leadership, conformity often meant shedding pro-life principles. Rush Limbaugh used to hammer this home on his show, spotlighting flip-floppers who traded beliefs for advancement.
Al Gore is exhibit A: As a Tennessee congressman in the 1980s, he opposed federal funding for abortions, even in cases of rape or incest unless the mother’s life was at stake, and wrote to constituents that it was “wrong to spend federal funds for what is arguably the taking of a human life.” By his 2000 presidential run, Gore was all-in on pro-choice, admitting the shift and reframing abortion as not involving a human life.
Dick Gephardt followed suit: Early in his Missouri congressional career, he co-sponsored a constitutional amendment to ban abortion, earning a zero from NARAL and calling Roe v. Wade “unjust.” Launching his 1988 presidential bid, he flipped, dropping support for restrictions and aligning with the base-paving his path to House leadership.
Tom Daschle had a mixed record as a South Dakota senator, voting for the partial-birth abortion ban in 1999 and 2003, and proposing compromises with health exceptions. He navigated to Senate leadership by threading the needle, even as his bishop criticized him for clashing with Catholic teachings.
Harry Reid, the Mormon senator from Nevada, started out wanting Roe overturned, voting against amendments supporting it and backing partial-birth bans. His NARAL rating climbed from 29% in 2003 to 85% by 2013, allowing him to hold Senate leadership while evolving on other issues too.
These flips underscore the party’s growing intolerance for dissent-opportunism rewarded with power, while holdouts got sidelined. For a stark contrast, look to Phil Gramm, the gold standard of principled integrity. As a conservative “Boll Weevil” Democrat from Texas, Gramm co-authored the Gramm-Latta budget resolution in 1981, pushing through Ronald Reagan’s tax cuts and spending reductions despite party blowback. House Speaker Tip O’Neill retaliated by yanking Gramm’s seat on the Budget Committee-the first such punishment in decades for “disloyalty.”
Gramm didn’t cave or flip-flop. In January 1983, he resigned his House seat, switched to the Republican Party, and ran in a special election for his own vacancy. He told voters, “I had to choose between Tip O’Neill and y’all, and I decided to stand with y’all.” He won big-55 to 58 percent-in a deep-blue district, becoming the first Republican to hold it since the 19th century. Gramm went on to a stellar Senate career, co-authoring the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction law and championing deregulation. His move accelerated the Southern realignment, proving that aligning party with core values serves constituents honestly, even at personal risk.
Gramm’s steadfastness bridges us to Bill Clinton, who embodied the moderate mirage but proved pragmatic enough to deliver results through compromise. In 1992, Clinton ran as a “New Democrat” for the “forgotten middle class,” promising middle-class tax cuts (only the top 2% would pay more), ending “welfare as we know it,” getting tough on crime, and balanced immigration enforcement.
Once in office, the mask slipped: The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ditched broad cuts, raising top income rates to 36% and 39.6%, uncapping Medicare payroll taxes, hiking corporate rates, and adding a fuel tax. Then came the HillaryCare push for nationalized healthcare, which crashed and burned amid public outcry. The result? A 1994 midterm bloodbath-Republicans gained 54 House seats and eight in the Senate, seizing control.
But Clinton adapted, triangulating with the GOP Congress. He signed the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) for welfare reform with work requirements and time limits; the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) expanding deportations and border enforcement; and the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act cutting capital gains from 28% to 20%, creating Roth IRAs, and spurring the tech boom. Balanced budget deals followed, leading to surpluses.
Voters rewarded this pragmatism. Even during the Lewinsky scandal and impeachment, Clinton’s job approval hit 73% in Gallup polls, with economy ratings at 81%. Folks separated personal flaws from performance-the economy boomed, and bipartisan deals got credit.
The irony? Clinton’s views on welfare mandates (now seen as punitive), the 1994 crime bill (blamed for mass incarceration), enforcement-heavy immigration, and capital gains cuts would make him unwelcome in today’s Democratic Party. He’d face primary challenges for being too “conservative.”
That purge is evident in modern examples: Dan Lipinski, the pro-life Illinois Democrat who opposed abortion funding in the ACA, got primaried and ousted in 2020 by Marie Newman, with Planned Parenthood and EMILY’s List making it a single-issue takedown. Joe Crowley, the number-three Democrat in the House as chairman of the Democratic Caucus, was stunned in 2018 by a 28-year-old newcomer, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who ran a grassroots, progressive campaign highlighting Crowley’s corporate ties, perceived absenteeism in the district, and disconnect from its changing demographics-ending his tenure in a shocking upset.
Eliot Engel, the longtime chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee known for his strong, centrist pro-Israel stance and hawkish foreign policy views, was defeated in 2020 by progressive challenger Jamaal Bowman, who criticized Engel’s record on issues like the Iran nuclear deal, Israeli settlements, and overall “hawkishness,” along with Engel’s perceived detachment from the district during the pandemic. Henry Cuellar in Texas has dodged repeated primaries over abortion and guns; Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema exited amid similar pressures-Manchin retiring, Sinema going independent and skipping re-election.
Today’s federal Democratic bench is slim on Clinton-style triangulators. Ro Khanna in California comes closest with his “progressive capitalist” pitch-focusing on manufacturing revival, wages, and anti-corporate reforms while ditching PAC money and pushing term limits. But he’s still deep in the progressive caucus, backing Medicare for All and labor bills, ranking left-of-center without much cross-aisle borrowing from GOP ideas.
John Fetterman, the Pennsylvania senator, is the strongest current example. Elected in 2022 as a Bernie-backed progressive, he’s morphed into an “independent voice” inside the Democratic tent. He bucks the base by voting against shutdowns to protect military pay and SNAP, blasts party elitism and culture-war obsessions, supports some Trump nominees, backs tougher immigration like the Laken Riley bill, and is a pro-Israel hawk. Polls show his approval flipped-higher with Republicans (e.g., 62% in recent Quinnipiac), lower with Democrats (disapproval around 54%)-mirroring how voters reward pragmatism over purity, much like Clinton’s scandal-era resilience. In his 2025 memoir Unfettered, he calls for ditching toxic rhetoric and focusing on results.
The shrinking Blue Dog moderates-like Marie Gluesenkamp Perez in Washington, Jared Golden in Maine, or Vicente Gonzalez in Texas-prioritize bipartisanship on trade, energy, and security in tough districts, but they lack the national heft to broker big deals like Clinton did.
Voters calculate that some pragmatism is fine-even desirable-if it yields prosperity. Clinton’s highs amid scandal prove it: Bipartisan compromises fueled the boom, insulating him from personal baggage. But Democrats’ leftward purge has created a vacuum-no dominant figure brokers major wins on taxes, entitlements, or borders without base revolt. Progressives rule primaries and messaging, sidelining centrists.
As Democrats position “pragmatic” candidates for 2026 House and Senate gains amid economic gripes-think former Gov. Roy Cooper running for the open North Carolina Senate seat or Rep. Don Davis defending his competitive district-Republicans should expose the pattern: Campaign as moderates, govern as leftists. Without embracing Fetterman-style independence or Clinton-like results focus, the party risks more Spanberger/Sherrill disillusionment. Voters demand honesty-serve like Gramm with principle or Clinton with pragmatic wins, not flip for power. Otherwise, the midterms could deliver another 1994-style rebuke, flipping Congress and reminding Democrats that bait-and-switch has consequences.
